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Abstract
Revealed preference theory is a domain within economics that studies
rationalizability of behavior by (certain types of) utility functions. Given
observed behavior in the form of choice data, testing whether certain
conditions are satisfied gives rise to a variety of computational problems
that can be analyzed using operations research techniques. In this survey,
we provide an overview of these problems, their theoretical complexity,
and available algorithms for tackling them. We focus on consumer choice




Our world is full of choices. Before we step outside the door in the morning, we
have already chosen what to eat for breakfast and which clothes to wear. For
the morning commute, we decide how to travel, by what route, and whether
we’ll pick up coffee along the way. Dozens of small choices are made before it is
even time for lunch, and then there are the less frequent, but more important
decisions like buying a car, moving to a new home, or setting up retirement
savings. Neoclassical economists hypothesize that choices are made so as to
maximize utility. Given this hypothesis, it follows that each choice tells us
something about the decision maker. I In other words, choices reveal preferences,
and thereby provide information about an underlying utility function. As we
observe the choices of a decision maker over time, we can piece together more
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and more information. Given this information, a number of questions naturally
arise:
i) Does there exist a utility function which is consistent with all the informa-
tion we have?
ii) When a consistent utility function exists, does there exist one in a prespec-
ified class?
iii) When no consistent utility function exists, how close is the information to
being consistent?
These questions belong to the domain of revealed preference theory. In this
theory, it is usual to formulate a minimum set of prior assumptions, also known
as axioms, which are based on a theory of choice behavior. Thus, revealed
preference characterizations are defined as conditions on the observed choices of
decision makers. This approach allows for direct tests of the decision models,
without running the risk that excessively strong functional (mis)specifications
lead to rejections of the model.
Testing the axioms of revealed preference theory is a topic at the interface of
economics and operations research. We focus on the algorithmic aspects of solv-
ing the corresponding optimization/decision problems, and we highlight some
of the issues of interest from the operations research viewpoint. In particular,
we examine algorithms that can be used to test whether observed data satisfies
certain revealed preference conditions. We also look at the tractability, i.e., the
computational complexity of answering these questions, and we focus on the
worst-case time-bounds of algorithms for such questions; we refer to Garey and
Johnson [1979] or Cormen et al. [2001] for a thorough introduction to this field.
Following the classical framework of computational complexity, we are interested
in whether a particular question is easy (solvable in polynomial time) or hard
(np-hard), and what the best-known method is for answering the question.
Let us first motivate this computational point of view. In a very general
way, it is clear that computational issues have become increasingly important
in all aspects of science, and economics is no exception. This is reflected, in par-
ticular, in the economic literature on revealed preference, where computational
challenges are frequently and explicitly mentioned. We illustrate this claim with
three quotes from recent papers.
Echenique et al. [2011] write:
“Given [that calculating money pump costs can be a huge computa-
tional task], we check only for violations of garp that involve cycles
of limited length: lengths 2, 3, and 4.”
Choi et al. [2014] write (in the online appendix):
“Since the algorithm is computationally very intensive, for a small
number of subjects we report upper bounds on the consistent set.”
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Kitamura and Stoye [2014] write:
“It is computationally prohibitive to test stochastic rationality on 25
periods at once. We work with all possible sets of eight consecutive
periods, a problem size that can be very comfortably computed.”
These quotes signify the need for fast algorithms that can test rationality of
choices made by an individual (or a group of individuals), or at least to better
understand the tractability of these underlying questions.
Another trend that emphasizes the relevance of efficient computations in the
domain of revealed preference is the ever-increasing size of datasets. As in many
other fields of social and exact sciences, and as underlined by the pervasiveness of
buzzwords such as “big data” and “data science”, more and more information
is available about actual choices of decision makers. As a striking example,
it is now commonplace for brands or large retailers to track the purchases of
individual consumers or households. This activity yields numerous datasets
with sizes far beyond those provided by laboratory experiments. This only
reinforces the need for efficient methods, in order to be able to tackle and to
draw meaningful conclusions from huge datasets.
Because of such issues, there is a quickly growing body of work on computa-
tion and economics. As mentioned above, our objective is to give an overview
of algorithmic problems arising in revealed preference theory. Due to the wide
range of choice situations to which revealed preference has been applied, provid-
ing a comprehensive overview is not a realistic goal. We refer to Chambers and
Echenique [2016] for a recent monograph on the theory of revealed preference,
and to Crawford and De Rock [2014] for a survey dealing with empirical revealed
preference; an older overview can be found in Houtman [1995]. Here, we focus
on algorithmic results concerning tests of rational behavior in consumer choice
settings.
Before we close this introductory section, however, we find it useful to formu-
late in Section 1.2 a few comments on the relations between the stream of liter-
ature that we cover and the literature on preference modeling and utility-based
decision making, as they are traditionally handled in operations research. This
allows us to clarify some of the similarities and differences that exist between
an “economics” viewpoint (revealed preference) and an “operations research”
viewpoint (preference modelling and utility-based decision making).
1.2 Preference modeling and utility theory
Many of the results surveyed in this paper express conditions for the existence of
a utility function which represents the preferences revealed through the choices
made by consumers. Most of these results have been published by economists.
On the other hand, in operations research (OR) and in decision theory, there
is a long tradition of building explicit utility functions (sometimes called “value
functions”) based on information provided by a decision maker. More recently,
similar questions have also been investigated in preference learning, a subfield
of artificial intelligence (AI; see, e.g., Corrente et al. [2013]). Typically, in such
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settings, the preferences of the decision maker are expressed by pairwise com-
parisons of alternatives, or by rankings of the alternatives on multiple criteria.
The objective is then to build a utility function which is coherent with the ex-
pressed preferences, and which can be used, for instance, in order to evaluate
each and every alternative on a numerical or ordinal scale, or even to evaluate
alternatives that have not yet been seen. The utility functions under considera-
tion may be as simple as a (weighted) sum of criteria, or may be selected within
a parameterized class of functions whose parameters are to be determined. Clas-
sical references are, for instance, Fishburn [1970], Keeney and Raiffa [1976], and
recent surveys of closely related topics can be found in Greco et al. [2016], in
particular Bouyssou and Pirlot [2016], Dyer [2016], Moretti et al. [2016], Siskos
et al. [2016]. See also Corrente et al. [2016] for extensions.
There are, however, many differences between revealed preference theory
and utility-based decision aid theory. Let us briefly outline some of the most
striking ones.
• Many of the approaches proposed in OR and in AI are mostly prescriptive
or operational in nature. Their main objective is to help an individual,
or a group of individuals, to express and to structure their preferences,
so as to allow them to make informed decisions. In contrast, the revealed
preference literature is mostly normative and descriptive and is not meant
to support the decision making process.
• As a corollary of the previous item, an objective typically pursued in
OR and in AI is to explicitly build (“assess”, “elicit”) a utility function
which is compatible with the data. In the economic literature, a main
objective is to check the coherence of consumer choices with rationality
axioms proposed in the theory. Building a compatible utility function
(sometimes called the “recovery” issue in economics) is usually not viewed
as the primary outcome of the process. It should be noted, however,
that the existence proofs provided for instance by Afriat [1967a] or Varian
[1982] (see Section 3 hereunder) are constructive and provide an analytical
expression of the utility function, when it exists. Predicting, or bounding
the demand bundles associated with future prices is also a topic in interest
in economics; see, e.g., Blundell [2005].
• In the OR literature on utility theory, the alternatives are classically con-
sidered as “abstract”, “unspecified” entities: most papers in this stream
start with the assumption that the decision maker is facing “a set A of
alternatives”, or potential actions, but the nature of these alternatives
is not directly relevant for the development of the theoretical framework
(although, of course, the alternatives must be fully determined in any spe-
cific application of the theory); see Dyer [2016], Fishburn [1970], Keeney
and Raiffa [1976]. In revealed preference theory, on the other hand, the
alternatives are bundles of goods, and this assumption is crucial for the
definition of the preference relation, as we explain next.
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• In OR, preferences among alternatives can be formulated in a variety of
ways (e.g., through pairwise comparisons of alternatives), but are solely
based on declarations of the decision maker. Thus, the preferences, just
like the alternatives, are seen as “atomic structures” which cannot be
decomposed into more primitive subcomponents. In revealed preference
settings, on the contrary, the preferences between bundles are explicitly
derived by the analyst from pairwise comparisons of the prices of the
bundles purchased by the decision maker, so that the existence of bundles
and prices plays a central role in the theory.
• In OR, the procedure used to elicit the utility function often rests on the
formulation of questions that can be submitted to the decision maker,
possibly in an interactive, dynamic process; so, the design of the most
appropriate experiments is an important issue to be tackled by the analyst.
In revealed preference settings, the analyst usually faces the results of
uncontrolled experiments, in the form of a database of observations which
have been typically collected for other purposes (although the issue of
experimental design is also discussed, for instance, in Blundell [2005]).
• As a consequence of the previous point, the datasets considered in OR are
usually quite small, and computational complexity, or even algorithmic
considerations are almost non existent in the OR literature on preference
modeling. On the contrary, the databases to be handled in revealed prefer-
ence studies are potentially huge, so that complexity issues naturally arise
and have been considered, more or less explicitly, by various researchers.
They provide the main theme to be covered in this paper.
In spite of the inherent differences outlined above, and in spite of the fact
that the streams of research on decision making and on revealed preference have
evolved in almost total separation, there remain some obvious commonalities be-
tween these two topics. The objective of our survey, however, is not to establish
a comparative study, but rather to provide the reader with an overview of fun-
damental results and of recent developments in the field of algorithmic revealed
preference. We hope that this may lay the ground for future cross-fertilization
between operations research and revealed preference theory.
1.3 Outline of the survey
We begin this survey by introducing key concepts in revealed preference theory,
such as utility functions and preference relations, in Section 2. Next, in Sec-
tion 3, we state the fundamental theorems that characterize rationalizability in
revealed preference theory. We explicitly connect rationalizability with proper-
ties in particular graphs, and we state the worst-case complexity of algorithms
that establish whether a given dataset satisfies a particular “axiom” of revealed
preference. In Section 4 we look at various kinds of utility functions that have
been considered in the literature, and we provide corresponding rationalizability
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theorems. Section 5 deals with goodness-of-fit and power measures, which re-
spectively quantify the severity of violations and give a measure of how stringent
the tests are. In Section 6 we explore collective settings, where the observed
choices are the result of joint decisions by several individuals. Finally, we look
at stochastic preferences in Section 7, where the decision maker still attempts to
maximize her utility, but preferences are not necessarily constant. Instead, the
decision maker has a number of different utility functions, and which of these
utility functions she maximizes at any given time is probabilistically determined.
We conclude in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we lay the groundwork for things to come: Section 2.1 introduces
utility functions, and their properties, Section 2.2 introduces the different axioms
of revealed preference, and Section 2.3 shows how graphs can be built from a
given set of observations.
2.1 Basic properties of utility functions
Let us first introduce the basic ideas of revealed preference, by considering
purchasing decisions and utility maximization. Specifically, consider a world
with m different goods, whose prices are denoted by the (1×m) vector p ∈ Rm++.
The decision maker is given a budget b ∈ R, which she can use to buy a bundle
of goods denoted by the (m× 1) vector q ∈ Rm+ . Under the classical hypothesis
of utility maximization, the choice of the decision maker is guided by a utility
function u(q) : Rm+ → R+. Thus, the decision maker selects (consciously or
not) an optimal bundle q by solving the following problem, for any given price
vector p and budget b.
Maximize u(q)
subject to pq ≤ b.
Following standard economic theory, we assume this utility function to be
concave, continuous and strictly monotone, a set of properties we capture in the
following definition:
Definition 1. Well-behaved Utility Function
A utility function u(q) : Rm+ → R+ is well-behaved if and only if u is concave,
continuous, and strictly monotone.
Another relevant property of a utility function is the potential uniqueness of
its optima. This is formulated as follows.
Definition 2. Single-valued Utility Function
A utility function u(q) : Rm+ → R+ is single-valued if and only if, for each p, b,
the problem {Maximize u(q)subject to pq ≤ b} has a unique optimal solution q.
Of course, there are many other properties that one may want to require
from a utility function; we come back to this issue in Section 4.
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2.2 Preference relations and axioms of revealed preference
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that data is collected by observing, at
n different points in time, the prices and quantities of all goods that are bought.
This yields a dataset S = {(pi, qi)| i ∈ N}, where pi ∈ Rm++ is the vector of prices
at time i, qi ∈ Rm+ is the bundle purchased at time i, and N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. We
use the word observation to denote a pair (pi, qi), i ∈ N .
Samuelson [1938] introduced the definition of the direct revealed preference
relation over the set of bundles.
Definition 3. Direct Revealed Preference Relation
For any pair of observations i, j ∈ N , if piqi ≥ piqj, we say that qi is directly
revealed preferred over qj, and we write qi R0 qj.
The interpretation of Definition 3 is quite intuitive: indeed, note that piqi
and piqj respectively express the total price of bundle qi and bundle qj at time i,
that is, when the prices pi apply. If the inequality piqi ≥ piqj holds, we thus
observe that bundle qi was purchased at time i in spite of the fact that qi was
at least as expensive as qj at time i. The natural conclusion is that the decision
maker prefers bundle qi over qj (otherwise, she would have bought qj), and this
is the meaning of the relation R0.
Assume now that we wish to test the hypothesis of utility maximization. In
the empirical setting, the budget available to the decision maker at time i ∈ N
is generally unobservable, but it is natural to assume that it is equal to piqi. (As
a matter of fact, if the decision maker maximizes her utility and if the utility
function is monotonic, then the bundle picked at each period must exhaust the
available budget, which is therefore equal to piqi at time i.)
We now wish to test whether the given dataset is consistent with the theory
of utility maximization. For the data to be consistent with that theory, there
must exist a utility function such that all purchasing decisions maximize utility
under the budget constraints. We say that a utility function satisfying this
requirement rationalizes the data, and we call it a rationalizing utility function.
Definition 4. Rationalizability
A dataset S = {(pi, qi)| i ∈ N} is rationalizable by a well-behaved (single-
valued) utility function if and only if there exists a well-behaved (single-valued)
utility function u such that for every observation i ∈ N ,
u(qi) ≥ u(qj) for all j ∈ N with piqj ≤ piqi.
This rationalizability concept is key in revealed preference theory, and goes
back to the work of Antonelli [1886]. In words, Definition 4 expresses that, at
each time i ∈ N , the choice of the decision maker was rational in the sense
that she picked the bundle which maximizes her utility among all (observed)
bundles qj , j ∈ N , whose total price piqj (at time i) was within the budget piqi.
Restricting the attention to the finite set of bundles {qj | j ∈ N} that actually
have been observed in the dataset, rather than considering the infinite universe
Rm+ of all bundles that could potentially be bought by the decision maker, will
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allow us to test Definition 4 in an empirical setting, as we will find out in the
next sections.
In terms of the direct revealed preference relation, the utility function u(q)
rationalizes the data if and only if u(qi) ≥ u(qj) for all i, j ∈ N such that
qi R0 qj : in the terminology of Fishburn [1970], this means that u(q) is order-
preserving for R0, ; see also Bouyssou and Pirlot [2016]). Therefore, it is natural
to investigate conditions on R0 which ensure that a data set is rationalizable.
This observation led Samuelson [1938] to formulate the Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preference.
Definition 5. Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (warp)
A dataset S satisfies warp if and only if, for each pair of distinct bundles qi, qj,
i, j ∈ N with qi R0 qj, it is not the case that qj R0 qi.
warp is the first rationalizability condition proposed in the literature. It
requires the revealed preference relation to be asymmetric. The intuition behind
it is simple: if the decision maker shows through her decision that she prefers
bundle qi over qj at time i, then she cannot at another time show that she prefers
qj over qi (assuming she behaves as a utility maximizer). In other words, warp
is a necessary condition for rationalizability by a single-valued utility function
(see Section 3). On the other hand, we notice that warp does not require the
direct revealed preference relation to be transitive, so that warp is not sufficient
for rationalizability.
The work of Samuelson was further developed by Houthakker [1950], who
noted that by using transitivity, the direct revealed preference relations could
be extended to indirect relations.
Definition 6. Revealed Preference Relation
For any sequence of observations i1, i2, . . . , ik ∈ N , if qi1 R0 qi2 R0 . . . R0 qik ,
we say that qi1 is revealed preferred over qik , and we write qi1 R qik .
Using these revealed preference relations, Houthakker formulated the Strong
Axiom of Revealed Preference.
Definition 7. Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (sarp)
A dataset S satisfies sarp if and only if for each pair of distinct bundles qi, qj,
i, j ∈ N with qi R qj, it is not the case that qj R0 qi.
In order to be able to model strict preferences, Varian [1982] introduced the
strict direct revealed preference relation, and using this relation, defined the
generalized axiom of revealed preference, garp.
Definition 8. Strict Direct Revealed Preference Relation
For any pair of observations i, j ∈ N , if piqi > piqj, we say that qi is strictly
revealed preferred over qj, and we write qi P0 qj.
Definition 9. Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (garp)
A dataset S satisfies garp if and only if for each pair of distinct bundles, qi, qj,
i, j ∈ N , such that qi R qj, it is not the case that qj P0 qi.
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Figure 1: Relations of the axioms of revealed preference
Price vector pi Bundle qi
Observation i = 1 (2 2 2) (2 2 2)
Observation i = 2 (1 2 4) (4 0 2)
Observation i = 3 (2 1 3) (4 4 0)
Observation i = 4 (4 2 1) (0 1 4)
Table 1: An example
Figure 1 illustrates the relations between the different core axioms of revealed
preference theory (warp, sarp, and garp). Indeed, any dataset satisfying sarp
satisfies both warp and garp, and there exist datasets not satisfying sarp that
satisfy both warp and garp (see Table 1).
2.3 Graphs representing a dataset
We now describe how to build a directed graph that can be used to represent a
dataset; this construction originates from Koo [1971]. As we wil see in Section 3,
such graphs are very useful tools in deciding rationalizability. Given a datset
S = {(pi, qi)| i ∈ N}, we build a directed weighted graph GS = (VS , AS) as
follows. For each observation i ∈ N , there is a node in VS , i.e., VS := N .
Further, there is an arc from node i to node j in AS exactly when piqi ≥ piqj
and qi 6= qj (or equivalently, when qi R0 qj and qi 6= qj). Observe that in GS
there is no arc between distinct observations that feature an identical bundle.
Finally, the length of an arc (i, j) ∈ AS equals pi(qj − qi). Notice that this
length is always nonpositive.
To illustrate this construction, consider a small dataset consisting of four
observations, as depicted in Table 1. This dataset gives rise to the graph outlined
in Figure 2.
An alternative version of this construction was proposed by Talla Nobibon
et al. [2016]. These authors defined a directed graph GR0 which is simply the
graph of the direct preference relation R0: the node set of GR0 is again N , and
there is an arc from node i to node j if and only if qi R0 qj (including when




Figure 2: A Revealed Preference Graph
3 Fundamental Results
In this section, we connect the fundamentals given in Section 2, and we formulate
the theorems that characterize rationalizability. Clearly, a main goal within
revealed preference theory is to test whether there exists a (particular) utility
function rationalizing a given dataset S.
3.1 Testing GARP
Necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizability of a given dataset by a
well-behaved utility function are given in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. (GARP)
The following statements are equivalent.
1. The dataset S = {(pi, qi)| i ∈ N} is rationalizable by a well-behaved utility
function u(q).
2. There exist strictly positive numbers Ui, λi for i ∈ N satisfying the system
of linear inequalities
Ui ≤ Uj + λjpj(qi − qj) ∀i, j ∈ N. (1)
3. S satisfies garp.
4. Each arc contained in a cycle of the graph GS has length 0.
The inequalities comprising system (1) are called the Afriat Inequalities. It
is not difficult to see that system (1) can be reformulated as a linear program.
Indeed, notice that multiplying a given feasible solution (Ui, λi : i ∈ N) by any
positive constant gives again a feasible solution; thus, one can require each of the
variables to be at least equal to 1, and not just strictly positive. The equivalence
of statements 1 and 2 in Theorem 1 was established by Afriat [1967a], and their
equivalence with statements 3 is due to [Varian, 1982]. Statement 4 is easily
derived from the definition of garp. Thus, Afriat [1967a] provided a linear
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program, formed by the Afriat Inequalities, that characterizes rationalizability
by a well-behaved utility function. This allows us to conclude that GARP
can be tested in polynomial time (although no polynomial time algorithms for
solving linear programming problems were known at the time Afriat published
his work).
Rationalizability tests for consistency of datasets with garp have gone through
a number of stages. Diewert [1973] states another linear programming formu-
lation. Varian’s formulation of garp [Varian, 1982] provides another algorithm
for testing rationalizability. This formulation shows that rationalizability can
be tested by computing the transitive closure of the direct revealed preference
relation. This transitive closure yields all revealed preference relations, direct
and indirect. Given the transitive closure, garp can be tested by checking,
for each pair of bundles qi, qj , i, j ∈ N , whether both qi R qj and qj P0 qi
simultaneously hold. The bottleneck in this procedure is the computation of
the transitive closure. Varian suggests to use Warshall’s algorithm [Warshall,
1962], which has a worst-case time complexity of O(n3); he also notes the ex-
istence of faster algorithms based on matrix multiplication, which at the time
achieved O(n2.74) complexity [Munro, 1971]. By now, these algorithms have im-
proved, the best known algorithms for general matrices having O(n2.373) time
complexity [Coppersmith and Winograd, 1990, Williams, 2012, Le Gall, 2014].
Recently, Talla Nobibon et al. [2015] described an algorithm with a worst-
case bound of O(n2) for garp, based on the computation of strongly connected
components of the graph GS . An alternative, simple statement of the O(n
2)
test is derived in Talla Nobibon et al. [2016] from the observation that a dataset
S satisfies garp if and only if piqi = piqj for each arc (i, j) contained in a
strongly connected component of GR0 (see Condition 4 of Theorem 1). Shiozawa
[2016] describes yet another way to test garp in O(n2) time, using shortest
path algorithms. Talla Nobibon et al. [2015] prove a lower bound on testing
garp, showing that no algorithm can exist with time complexity smaller than
O(n log n).
3.2 Testing SARP
Analogously to Theorem 1, we now give a theorem that provides necessary and
sufficient conditions relating to sarp.
Theorem 2. (SARP)
The following statements are equivalent.
1. The dataset S = {(pi, qi)| i ∈ N} is rationalizable by a well-behaved,
single-valued utility function u(q).
2. There exist strictly positive numbers Ui, λi for i ∈ N satisfying the system
of linear inequalities
Ui < Uj + λjpj(qi − qj) ∀i, j ∈ N. (2)
3. S satisfies sarp.
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4. The graph GS is acyclic.
Houthakker [1950], extending the work of Samuelson, introduced the formu-
lation of sarp and proved the equivalence of statements 1 and 3. Statement 2
is an extension of Theorem 1.
Again, observe that system (2) can be cast into a linear optimization for-
mat. Using a matrix representation of the direct revealed preference relations,
Koo [1963] describes a sufficient condition for consistency with sarp. Dobell
[1965] is the first to describe conditions which are both necessary and sufficient.
Dobell’s test is based on the matrix representation of direct revealed preference
relations. He proposes checking whether every square submatrix of the direct
revealed preference matrix contains at least one row and one column consisting
completely of 0 elements. Since there is an exponential number of such sub-
matrices, this test runs in exponential time. Koo [1971] later publishes another
paper where he observes that testing sarp amounts to checking whether GS is
acyclic: this can be done in O(n2) time, and is to-date the most efficient avail-
able method for testing consistency with sarp. An alternative version of this
test is provided by Talla Nobibon et al. [2016]. These authors observe that S
satisfies sarp if and only if, within each strongly connected component of GR0 ,
all bundles are identical. This condition can again be checked in O(n2) time by
relying on Tarjan’s algorithm to compute all strong components of GR0 [Tarjan,
1972].
3.3 Testing WARP
For the sake of completeness, let us now state an easy result which is in fact
nothing but a restatement of the definition of warp.
Theorem 3. (WARP)
The following statements are equivalent.
1. The dataset S = {(pi, qi)| i ∈ N} satisfies WARP.
2. The graph GS does not contain any cycle consisting of two arcs.
As mentioned before, satisfying WARP is only a necessary condition for
rationalizability by a single-valued utility function. However, in the special
case where the dataset involves only two goods (i.e., m = 2), warp is both a
necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability by a single-valued utility
function [Samuelson, 1948, Little, 1949].
Testing warp can be done in O(n2) time, since testing each pair of ob-
servations for a violation is sufficient. More explicitly, after having computed
the quantities piqi and piqj for all distinct i, j ∈ N , WARP can be rejected if
and only if there exists a pair of distinct i, j ∈ N such that piqi ≥ piqj and
pjqj ≥ pjqi.
Finally, let us point out that the graph characterization of garp, sarp and
warp allows us to easily conclude (using Figure 2) that the dataset given in
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Table 1 satisfies warp (as there are no 2-cycles in GS), satisfies garp (as the
cycle 1-2-3 has length 0), and does not satisfy sarp (as GS is not acyclic).
Rationalizability questions are not limited to general utility functions. In
the next sections, we are interested in the question whether datasets can be
rationalized by utility functions of a specific form (Section 4), by collective
choice processes (Section 6), or by heuristic choice processes (Section 7).
4 Other Classes of Utility Functions and their
Rationalizability
Besides the basic tests discussed in the previous paragraphs, conditions and tests
have been derived for testing rationalizability by various specific forms of utility
functions. In this section we consider two additional classes of utility functions:
utility functions that are separable (Section 4.1), and utility functions that are
homothetic (Section 4.2). In addition, we assume from now on that the utility
functions are non-satiated. This is a concept used to model the property that
for every bundle q there is another bundle q′ in the neighborhood of q that is
preferred over q. Formally: (Jehle and Reny [2011])
Definition 10. Non-satiated Utility Functions
A utility function u(·) is non-satiated if, for each q ∈ Rm and for each  > 0,
there exists q′ ∈ Rm with ||q′ − q|| ≤  such that u(q′) > u(q).
This property rules out, in particular, that a consumer prefers a particu-
lar bundle to any other one. It also imposes some form of continuity to the
preferences over bundldes.
4.1 Separable utility functions
Separability of a utility function refers to the property that different goods in
a bundle may have no joint effect on the utility of the bundle; then, goods can
be regarded as independent of each other. More generally, it is often assumed
that there exists a partition of the goods into R subsets such that goods from
different sets do not interact. Hence, separability of a utility function is defined
with respect to a given partition of the goods. More concrete, given a partition
of the goods into R disjoint sets, we denote by mj the number of goods in set j,
1 ≤ j ≤ R. Any bundle of goods can then be written as q = (q1, . . . , qR), with
qj ∈ Rmj+ denoting the vector of quantities for the goods in set j, 1 ≤ j ≤ R.
There are two versions of separability: strong and weak. We first provide the
definition for a utility function to be strongly separable (also known as additive).
Definition 11. Strongly Separable Utility Functions
A utility function u(q) is strongly separable with respect to a given partition of
the set of goods {1, 2, . . . ,m} if and only if there exist well-behaved functions
fj(q
j) : Rmj+ → R+ for each j ∈ {1, . . . , R} such that
u(q) = f1(q
1) + f2(q
2) + . . .+ fR(q
R).
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The case where we partition the set of goods into two subsets, i.e., the case
R = 2, allows the following theorem due to Varian [1983].
Theorem 4. The following statements are equivalent.
1. There exists a strongly separable, well-behaved, non-satiated utility func-
tion u(f(q1), q2) rationalizing the dataset S = {(pi, qi)| i ∈ N}.
2. There exist strictly positive numbers Ui, Vi, λi with i ∈ N satisfying the
system of linear inequalities
Ui ≤ Uj + λjp1j (q1i − q1j ) ∀i, j ∈ N, (3)
Vi ≤ Vj + λjp2j (q2i − q2j ) ∀i, j ∈ N. (4)
Varian [1983] also gives a linear programming formulation for arbitrary R,
allowing for a polynomial-time test of rationalizability by a strongly separable
utility function.
A weaker version of separability occurs when the utilities of the different sub-
bundles are not necessarily summed to obtain the total utility; weak separability
rather assumes that there exists a function, denoted u′, that takes as input the
utilities of the individual groups of goods, and translates these into a total
utility.
Definition 12. Weakly Separable Utility Functions
A utility function u(q) is weakly separable with respect to q1, . . . , qR−1 if and
only if there exist functions fj(q
j) : Rmj+ → R+ for each j ∈ {1, . . . , R− 1} and
a function u′(x1, . . . , xR−1, qR) such that
u(q) = u′(f1(q1), . . . , fR−1(qR−1), qR).
Following his paper on general utility functions, Afriat also wrote an unpub-
lished work on separable utility functions [Afriat, 1967b]. Varian [1983] built
further on this, giving a non-linear system of inequalities, reproduced below in
Theorem 5, for which the existence of a solution is a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for rationalizability by a well-behaved, weakly separable utility function
with R = 2 sets of goods.
Theorem 5. The following statements are equivalent.
1. There exists a weakly separable, well-behaved, non-satiated utility function
u(f(q1), q2) rationalizing the dataset S = {(pi, qi)| i ∈ N}.
2. There exist strictly positive numbers Ui, Vi, λi, µi for i ∈ N satisfying the
system of non-linear inequalities
Ui ≤ Uj + λjp2j (q2i − q2j ) + (λj/µj)(Vi − Vj) ∀i, j ∈ N, (5)
Vi ≤ Vj + µjp1j (q1i − q1j ) ∀i, j ∈ N. (6)
14
Diewert and Parkan [1985] extend this result to multiple separable subsets.
Cherchye et al. [2015] prove that testing rationalizability by a weakly separa-
ble utility function is np-Hard even for R = 2. They also provide an integer
programming formulation which is equivalent to (5)-(6). Several heuristic ap-
proaches have been formulated for testing weak separability. Varian attempts to
overcome the computational difficulties by finding a solution to the linear part
of the system of inequalities and then fixing variables based on this solution,
which linearizes the remainder of the inequalities. This implementation can be
too restrictive, as the variables are usually fixed with values making the sys-
tem infeasible, even if a solution exists, as shown by Barnett and Choi [1989].
Fleissig and Whitney [2003] take a similar approach, but improve on it by fixing
variables with values that are more likely to allow solutions to the rest of the
system of equalities. Exact tests of (adaptations of) Varian’s inequalities are de-
scribed in Swofford and Whitney [1994] and Fleissig and Whitney [2008]. Both
use non-linear programming packages to find solutions and are limited in the
size of datasets they can handle. Computational results in Cherchye et al. [2015]
suggest that the integer programming approach is feasible for moderately sized
datasets. Hjertstrand et al. [2016] use this approach in an application testing
separability of consumption, leisure and money. When dropping the concavity
assumption, the rationalizability problem remains np-Hard, even if the dataset
is limited to 9 goods [Echenique, 2014]. Quah [2014] provides an algorithm for
testing separable utility functions without the concavity assumption. Swofford
and Whitney [1994] modify (5)-(6) to account for consumers needing time to
adjust their spending.
4.2 Homothetic utility functions
Another class of utility functions of interest are the homothetic utility functions.
Their definition is based on the concept of a homogenous function.
Definition 13. Homogenous Functions
A function f(·) is homogenous when f(λq) = λf(q), for each q ∈ Rm and for
each λ ∈ R.
Definition 14. Homothetic Utility Functions
A utility function u(·) is homothetic when there exist a homogenous function f
and a monotonic function ` such that u(q) = `(f(q)) for each q ∈ Rm.
In effect, if u is homothetic and if u(qi) ≥ u(qj) for two bundles qi, qj , then for
any constant α > 0, u(αqi) ≥ u(αqj). Theorem 6 gives necessary and sufficient
conditions for rationalizability of a dataset by a homothetic utility function.
One of these conditions is based on the following graph H = (VS , AS) (whose
construction is in the spirit of the construction described in Section 2.3). For
each observation i ∈ N , there is a node in VS , i.e., VS := N . Further, for each
ordered pair of observations (i, j), there is an arc of length log(piqj) between
the corresponding nodes.
Theorem 6. The following statements are equivalent.
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1. There exists a non-satiated homothetic utility function u(·) rationalizing
the dataset S = {(pi, qi)| i ∈ N}.
2. There exist strictly positive numbers Ui for i ∈ N satisfying the inequalities
Ui ≤ Ujpjqi ∀i, j ∈ N. (7)
3. For all distinct choices of observations (i1, i2, . . . , ik), we have
(pi1qi2)(pi2qi3) . . . (pikqi1) ≥ 1. (8)
4. The graph HS does not contain a cycle of negative length.
The equivalence of statements 1, 2 and 3 was proven by Afriat [1972, 1981].
Based on the equivalence of statements 1 and 3, Varian [1983] proposes a com-
binatorial test captured in statement 4.
Varian [1983] also provides a test for homothetic, separable utility functions,
which is again a difficult-to-solve system of non-linear inequalities. Finally, util-
ity maximization in case of rationing (i.e., there are additional linear constraints
on the bundles which can be bought, on top of the budget constraint) is also
handled by Varian. He provides a linear system of inequalities whose feasibility
is a necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability.
In summary, various forms of utility functions are usually associated with a
system of inequalities, for which the existence of a solution is a necessary and
sufficient condition for rationalizability by such a utility function. The diffi-
culty of these rationalizability tests crucially depends on whether the systems
are linear or non-linear. General, single-valued and strongly separable utility
functions are easy to rationalize, as their associated systems of inequalities are
linear. The same holds true for utility maximization by a general utility func-
tion under rationing constraints. For general and single-valued utility functions,
more straightforward tests have been developed. A polynomial test also exists
for rationalizability by a homothetic utility function. On the other hand, for
those utility functions associated with non-linear systems of inequalities, that
is, weakly separable and homothetic separable functions, no efficient tests are
known. For weakly separable utility, formal np-Hardness results exist. For
homothetic separable functions, the complexity question remains open.
To complete our overview on rationalizability by general utility functions,
we mention some recent work on indivisible goods and non-linear budget sets.
Forges and Minelli [2009] give a revealed preference characterization for non-
linear budgets, for which garp is a sufficient and necessary condition for ra-
tionalizability by an increasing and continuous utility function. Cherchye et al.
[2014] give conditions for rationalizability by an increasing, concave and contin-
uous utility function for the setting with non-linear budgets. They note that,
together with the results by Forges and Minelli, this allows for tests of the
concavity of utility functions which is not possible in the setting with linear
budgets. Computationally there is no obvious easy way to test the conditions
laid out by Cherchye et al. in general. However, they show that if the budgets
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can be represented by a finite union of polyhedral convex sets, a system of linear
inequalities provides conditions for rationalizability. Fujishige and Yang [2012]
and Polisson and Quah [2013] extend the revealed preference results to the case
with indivisible goods. They find that garp is a necessary and sufficient test
for rationalizability, given a suitable adaptation of the revealed preference rela-
tions for their setting. Cosaert and Demuynck [2015] look at choice sets which
are non-linear and have a finite number of choice alternatives. They provide
revealed preference characterizations for weakly monotone, strongly monotone,
weakly monotone and concave, and strongly monotone and concave utility func-
tions, all of which are easy to test, either by some variant of garp or a system
of linear inequalities.
5 Goodness-of-Fit and Power Measures
An often cited limitation of rationalizability tests is that they are binary tests:
either the dataset is rationalizable or it is not. Thus, when violations of ra-
tionalizability conditions are found, there is no indication of their severity.
Likewise, when the rationalizability conditions are satisfied, this could be be-
cause the choices faced by the decision maker make it unlikely that violations
would occur. To refine this yes/no verdict inherent to rationalizability, so-called
goodness-of-fit measures and power measures have been proposed in the litera-
ture. Goodness-of-fit measures (Section 5.1) quantify the severity of violations,
while power measures (Section 5.2) indicate how far the choices are from vio-
lating rationalizability conditions.
5.1 Goodness-of-Fit Measures
A first class of goodness-of-fit measures is based on the systems of inequalities
which are used to establish rationalizability of many different forms of utility
functions (see Section 3). Slack variables are added to these systems, so as
to relax the constraints on the data. An optimization problem can then be
defined, for which the objective function is the minimization of some appropriate
function of the slack variables, such as their sum, under the constraint that
the system of equalities is satisfied. The goodness-of-fit measure is then equal
to the value of the optimal solution of this optimization problem. Such an
approach was first described by Diewert [1973] and has since been used in a
number of different papers for various forms of utility functions (see Diewert and
Parkan [1985], Fleissig and Whitney [2005, 2008] for weak separability, Fleissig
and Whitney [2007] for additive separability). Computing the goodness-of-fit
measure is easy if the system of inequalities is linear, which is the case for
general utility functions and additive separable utility functions. In the case of
non-linear systems of inequalities, minimizing the sum of the slack variables is at
least as hard as finding a solution to the system without slack variables. Since
this is already np-Hard for weakly separable utility functions, the hardness
result remains valid for these goodness-of-fit measures.
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A second class of goodness-of-fit measures is due to Afriat [1973], and is
based on strengthening the revealed preference relations. In this case, revealed
preference relations are assumed to hold if the difference in price between the
chosen bundle and another affordable bundle is big enough. This is done by
adding efficiency indices 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1 for each observation i ∈ N , and defining
the revealed preference relation R0(e1, . . . , en) as follows:
for all i, j ∈ N , if eipiqi ≥ piqj , then qiR0(e1, . . . , en) qj . (9)
Obviously, when ei = 1, conditions (9) are the same revealed preference relations
as in Definition 3; when ei < 1, condition (9) can be interpreted as defining a
revealed preference relation between two bundles for which the price difference
exceeds a certain fraction of the budget. As a result, there will be fewer revealed
preference relations, and axioms such as warp, sarp and garp will be easier
to satisfy. A goodness-of-fit measure is then the maximum value of the sum of
the ei values, under the constraint that a given axiom of revealed preference
is satisfied by R0(e1, . . . , en). Three different goodness-of-fit indices based on
this idea have been respectively described by Afriat [1973], Varian [1990] and
Houtman and Maks [1985]. Of these three, Afriat’s index is the simplest, as it
constrains the ei values to be equal for every observation (e1 = e2 = . . . = en).
Afriat’s index can be computed in polynomial time (see Smeulders et al. [2014],
although for a long time the only published algorithm was an approximation al-
gorithm due to Varian [1990]). Varian’s index, in contrast, allows the ei values
to differ between observations. This makes computation less straightforward
and the computation of this index was thus perceived to be hard (as confirmed
by Smeulders et al. [2014] who showed that computing Varian’s index is np-
Hard). This led to work on heuristic algorithms for computing Varian’s index
by [Varian, 1990], Tsur [1989], and more recently by Alcantud et al. [2010].
Finally, Houtman and Maks [1985] proposed to constrain the ei values to be
either 0 or 1. In effect, maximizing the sum of the ei’s amounts to removing
the minimum number of observations so that the remaining dataset is ratio-
nalizable. Houtman and Maks established a link between the feedback vertex
set problem (known to be np-Hard) and their index, thus informally show-
ing its difficulty; see Hjertstrand and Heufer [2015] for two methods computing
the Houtman-Maks index. The complexity of computing all three of the above
indices is addressed in Smeulders et al. [2014], who provide polynomial time
algorithms for Afriat’s index for various axioms of revealed preference, and es-
tablish NP-hardness of Varian’s index, and the Houtman-Maks index. Even
stronger, it is shown that no constant-factor approximation algorithms running
in polynomial time exist for these indices unless p = np. Boodaghians and
Vetta [2015] strengthen these hardness results, by showing that computing the
Houtman-Maks index is already np-Hard for datasets with only 3 goods.
A third approach to the definition of goodness-of-fit measures was introduced
by Varian [1985]. When a dataset fails to satisfy the rationalizability conditions,
the goal is here to find a dataset which does satisfy the conditions and is only
minimally different from the observed dataset. The problem of finding these
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minimally different satisfying datasets can be formulated as a non-linear opti-
mization problem, which, in general, is hard to solve. To avoid solving large
scale non-linear problems, De Peretti [2005] approaches this problem with an
iterative procedure. Working on garp, his algorithm tackles violations one at a
time, also perturbing only one observation at a time. If a preference cycle exists
between two bundles of goods qi and qj , i, j ∈ N , he computes the minimal per-
turbation necessary to remove the violation both for the case in which qi R0 qj
(in which case qi is perturbed) and for the case in which qj R0 qi (in which case
qj is perturbed). The smallest of the two perturbations is then used to update
the dataset, and the new dataset is checked again for garp violations. While
this algorithm does not guarantee an optimal solution, it allows handling large
datasets, especially if the number of violations is small.
A number of recent papers introduce new goodness-of-fit measures, thus
showing continued interest in this topic. Echenique et al. [2011] define the mean
and median money pump indices. In their paper, the severity of violations of
rationality is measured by the amount of money which an arbitrageur could
extract from the decision maker by exploiting her irrational choices. This is
reflected by a money pump index for every violation of rationality. Echenique
et al. propose to calculate the money pump index of the mean and median
violation as measures of the irrationality of the decision maker. Computing these
measures is np-Hard, as shown in Smeulders et al. [2013]. In the latter paper,
it is also shown that computing the money pump index for the most and least
severe violations can be done in polynomial time. Furthermore, Apesteguia and
Ballester [2015] introduce the minimal swaps index. Informally, the swaps index
of a given preference ordering over the alternatives is calculated by counting how
many better alternatives (according to the preference order) were not chosen
over all choice situations. The minimal swaps index is then the swaps index of
the preference order for which this index is minimal. Apesteguia and Ballester
show that computing the minimal swaps index is equivalent to the np-Hard
linear ordering problem. Finally, Dean and Martin [2016] define the minimum
cost index. This index is the minimum cost of removing revealed preference
relations, such that the remaining relations induce no violations. The cost of
removing violations is weighted by the price difference of the considered bundles.
Dean and Martin show that computing this index is np-hard by a reduction
from the set covering problem.
5.2 Power Measures
Power measures were first introduced by Bronars [1987], with the following
motivation. Consider a test that allows us to determine whether the observations
in a dataset are coherent with the choices of a utility-maximizing decision maker.
If the outcome of the test is positive for most datasets, including those where
choices were not made so as to maximize a utility function, then obviously
the test is not good at discriminating between utility maximizing behavior and
alternative behaviors.
19
Bronars [1987] proposes to use random choices as an alternative model of
behavior. The likelihood of this alternative model satisfying the rationalizability
conditions (that is, passing the test) is determined by Monte Carlo simulation.
The higher this likelihood, the lower the power of the test. Andreoni and Miller
[2002] use a similar approach: they generate synthetic datasets by bootstrapping
from observed choices, and use these alternative datasets to establish the power
of their test.
Bronars’s Monte Carlo approach has also been applied to goodness-of-fit
measures. The value of a goodness-of-fit measure is hard to interpret without
context. There is no natural level which, if crossed, indicates a large deviation
from rational behavior. Furthermore, the values of goodness-of-fit indices which
point to large deviations may vary from dataset to dataset, as the choices faced
by a decision maker may or may not allow large violations of rationalizabil-
ity. One way to establish what values are significant, is to generate random
datasets by a Monte Carlo approach and to calculate their goodness-of-fit mea-
sures. This yields a distribution of the values of goodness-of-fit measures for
datasets of random choices. It can then be checked whether the goodness-of-fit
measures computed for the actual decision makers are significantly different.
Examples of this approach are found in Choi et al. [2007] and Heufer [2012]. As
this framework requires a large number of computations of the goodness-of-fit
measures, there is a strong incentive to use efficient algorithms and to favor
measures which are easy to calculate.
Beatty and Crawford [2011] propose to evaluate the power of a test by cal-
culating the proportion of possible choices which would pass the test. Andreoni
et al. [2013] give an overview of power measures and introduce a number of new
power measures themselves. The measures they introduce are adaptations of
goodness-of-fit measures. For example, they introduce a Jittering index, which
is the minimum perturbation of the data such that the rationalizability condi-
tions are no longer satisfied, in line with of the work of Varian [1985]. They also
introduce an Afriat Power Index, which is the converse of Afriat’s goodness-of-
fit measure; that is, instead of considering the minimum value of e such that
the dataset no longer satisfies the considered axiom of revealed preference, they
propose to determine the maximum value of e such that the dataset does not
satisfy the conditions.
6 Collective Choices
In the preceding sections, datasets are analysed as if a single person buys or
chooses goods, so as to maximize her own utility function. However, in many
cases purchasing decisions are observed at the household level that consists of
multiple decision makers. Analyzing such datasets calls for collective models,
which account for individually rational household members, and in addition,
some decision process for splitting up the budget. The initial contributions in
revealed preference theory dealing with collective choice are published by Chi-
appori [1988], for the so-called labour supply setting. This setting corresponds
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to a situation in which there are two goods, namely leisure time, as well as
aggregated consumption, which are observed for each member in the household.
Also, we assume that the household consists of two decision makers. The be-
havior of this household is then rationalizable if the consumption can be split up
so that the resulting individual datasets of leisure and consumption are ratio-
nalizable for all individual household members. Chiappori provides conditions
for rationalizability, both for the cases with and without externalities of private
consumption. To model the labour supply setting in the collective choice model,
we use a dataset of the form S = {(w1i , w2i , L1i , L2i , Ci)| i ∈ N}, with w1i and





corresponding to their respective leisure time, and with Ci denoting the level
of (collective) consumption in the household (i ∈ N). Notice that, since wage
can be seen as the price of leisure time, and there is a unit price for aggregated
consumption, we can write pi = (w
1
i ,1) and qi = (L
1
i , fCi) (for some fraction
0 ≤ f ≤ 1). Hence, the dataset S can still be seen as a set of observations
consisting of price vectors and bundles.
Theorem 7. (Chiappori’s Theorem for collective rationalization by egoistical
agents)
The following statements are equivalent.
1. There exists a pair of concave, monotonic, continuous non-satiated utility
functions which provide a collective rationalization by egoistical agents.
2. There exist numbers Zi with 0 ≤ Zi ≤ Ci such that the following (equiva-
lent) conditions are satisfied.
(a) The datasets {(w1i ,1), (L1i , Zi)| i ∈ N} and {(w2i ,1), (L2i , Ci−Zi)| i ∈
N} both satisfy sarp.
(b) There exist strictly positive numbers U1i , U
2
i , λi, µi for i ∈ N satisfy-
ing the non-linear inequalities
U1i ≤ U1j + λjw1j (L1i − L1j ) + λj(Zi − Zj) ∀i, j ∈ N,
U2i ≤ U2j + µjw2j (L2i − L2j ) + µj(Ci − Zi − Cj − Zj) ∀i, j ∈ N,
with equality holding in the first (respectively, the second) inequality
only if L1i = L
1




j and Zi = Zj).
Theorem 7 states Chiappori’s result for collective rationalization by egoisti-
cal agents. (The agents are egoistical in the sense that they each spend their
own personal wages, so that the observed consumption is just the sum of the
individual ones.) No straightforward method is included in the paper to test the
first condition; the second condition requires solving a system of non-linear in-
equalities. Similar conditions hold for the case with externalities. Snyder [2000]
provides a reformulation of Chiappori’s conditions for two periods and uses it
in empirical tests. Thanks to the limit on the number of periods, this test is
very easy: it requires solving four small linear systems of inequalities. Cherchye
21
et al. [2011] depart from the labour supply setting by formulating a collective
model with an arbitrary number of goods. In their model, each specific good
is known to be either publicly or privately consumed. Given this information,
rationalizability is tested by checking whether there exists a split of prices (for
public goods) or quantities (for private goods), such that the dataset of person-
alized prices and quantities for each household member satisfies garp. Cherchye
et al. [2011] provide an integer programming formulation to test their model.
Talla Nobibon et al. [2016] provide a large number of practical and theoretical
computational results for this problem. First, they prove it is np-Hard. Fur-
thermore, they describe a more compact integer programming formulation, and
provide a simulated annealing based metaheuristic. They compare the com-
putational results with these different integer programming formulations and
heuristics; they observe that the heuristic approach is capable of tackling larger
datasets and seldom fails to find a feasible split when one exists. Smeulders et al.
[2015] give further hardness results for a collective version of warp: they find
that the problem remains np-Hard when testing for transitivity is dropped.
All hardness results for these problems assume that the number of goods is not
fixed a priori. It remains an open question whether the problems become easy
for a small, fixed number of goods. In particular, the labour supply setting only
requires one good to be partitioned over members of the household.
The work by Chiappori is generalized by Cherchye et al. [2007]. Leaving
the labour supply setting, they provide conditions for an arbitrary number of
goods and without any prior allocation of goods, as was the case with leisure
time in Chiappori’s work. Cherchye et al. [2007] derive separate necessary and
sufficient conditions for collective rationalizability by concave utility functions.
In a later paper, Cherchye et al. [2010] show that the necessary condition given
in their earlier work is both necessary and sufficient, when dropping the assump-
tion of concave utility functions. However, testing this condition is np-Hard,
as shown by Talla Nobibon and Spieksma [2010]. Due to the hardness of ra-
tionalizability in collective settings, a number of papers have appeared on how
to test this problem. An integer programming formulation is given by Cher-
chye et al. [2008] and an enumerative approach is provided by Cherchye et al.
[2009]. Talla Nobibon et al. [2011] take a different approach and propose a
heuristic algorithm. The goal of this algorithm is to quickly test whether the
rationalizability conditions are satisfied. If this heuristic cannot prove that the
conditions are satisfied, then an exact test is used. Using this heuristic pre-
test, many computationally demanding exact tests can be avoided. Deb [2010]
strengthens the hardness results by proving that a special case of this problem,
the situation dependent dictatorship setting, is also np-Hard. In this setting,
the household decision process is such that each purchasing decision is made by
a single household member, called the dictator. At different points in time, dif-
ferent household members can assume the role of the dictator; the goal is thus to
partition the observations into datasets, so that each dataset is consistent with
(unitary) garp. Crawford and Pendakur [2013] also consider this problem in
the context of preference heterogeneity, and provide algorithms for computing
upper and lower bounds on the number of ‘dictators’. Cosaert [2017] links this
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to the problem of computing the chromatic number of a graph. Furthermore,
Cosaert formulates an integer program to partition the observations into sets, so
that the observed characteristics within each set are as homogenous as possible.
Smeulders et al. [2015] give further hardness results for a collective version of
warp: they find that dropping transitivity makes the test easy for households
of two members, but the problem remains open for three or more members.
7 Revealed Stochastic Preference
In the previous sections, we have looked at methods that decide whether a set
of observations can be rationalized by one or more decision makers, using differ-
ent forms of utility functions, or different ways in which the choice process can
be split over several decision makers. However, we assumed that utility func-
tions and preferences are fully deterministic. As a result, if a choice situation
repeats itself, we expect that the decision maker always chooses the same al-
ternative. However, it is commonly observed in experiments on choice behavior
that if a person is given the same choice situation multiple times, her deci-
sion may change. One possible way of explaining this behavior is by stochastic
preferences, as pioneered by Block and Marschak [1960]. Theories of stochas-
tic preferences posit that, while at any point in time a decision maker has a
preference ordering over all alternatives, these preferences are not constant over
time and may fluctuate randomly. An observed behavior is rationalizable by
stochastic preferences if and only if there exists a set of utility functions and
a probability distribution over these utility functions, such that the frequency
with which an alternative is chosen in any given choice situation is equal to the
probability that this alternative has the highest utility in that situation. We
note that many results on stochastic preferences are established for the case of
finite choice sets, as opposed to the consumption setting, where there exists an
infinite number of bundles that can be bought for a given expenditure level and
prices. For an overview, we refer to McFadden [2005].
A very general result was established by McFadden and Richter [1990],
namely, the axiom of revealed stochastic preference (arsp), which states a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for rationalizability of choice probabilities by
stochastic preferences. The generality of this axiom allows it to be used for any
form of choice situation, and all classes of decision rules. Besides the axiom,
McFadden and Richter also provided a system of linear inequalities whose fea-
sibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability. Neither of
these characterizations can be easily operationalized, since arsp places a con-
dition on every possible subset of observations, so that the resulting number
of conditions is exponential in the number of observations. Furthermore, each
condition requires finding a decision rule among all allowed decision rules which
maximizes some function, and this can in itself be an np-Hard problem (for
example when the class of decision rules being tested are based on linear pref-
erence orders, this means solving an np-Hard linear ordering problem [Karp,
1972]). The linear system of inequalities, on the other hand, contains one vari-
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able for every possible decision rule within a class of decision rules, a number
which is often exponential in the number of choice alternatives.
For the setting of consumer purchases (and thus infinite choice sets), Bandy-
opadhyay et al. [1999] formulate the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference
(warsp). This axiom provides a necessary condition for rationalizability by
stochastic preferences. Analogously to warp, warsp compares pairs of choice
situations. Since the condition placed on these pairs is easy to test, warsp
allows for a polynomial time test. Heufer [2011] and Kawaguchi [2016] build
further on this work. Heufer provides a sufficient condition for rationalizabil-
ity in terms of stochastic preferences. Kawaguchi [2016] proposes the strong
axiom of revealed stochastic preference (sarsp), a necessary condition for ra-
tionalizability by stochastic preferences. Both of these conditions seem difficult
to test, requiring in the case of Heufer a feasible solution to a linear program
with an exponential number of constraints and variables. Kawaguchi’s sarsp
likewise requires checking an exponential number of inequalities. Despite these
challenges, Kitamura and Stoye [2014] develop a test which can be used to
test rationalizability by stochastic preferences on consumption data, though for
relatively small datasets. A key element in their approach is discretizing the
dataset, so as to return to a setting with a finite number of choice options.
8 Conclusion
From a practical point of view, the relevance of efficient revealed preference tests
for large datasets continues to increase due to the ever growing size of available
datasets. Better algorithms, both heuristic and exact, are required in order
to be able to cope with this phenomenon. Thus, we need to further increase
our understanding of the achievable running times for different versions of the
rationalizability question.
From a theoretical perspective, one issue concerns establishing the compu-
tational complexity in settings with a limited, fixed number of goods. We have
mentioned in this survey some first results in this direction, however, many
questions remain open when the number of goods is fixed. Other questions
deal with a priori specifications of the utility function - how does a particular
desired property impact the tractability of the rationalizability question? An-
swering these questions will not only reveal the inherent difficulty of testing
rationalizability of a given dataset by a utility function from a particular class,
it will also shed light on the incentives and properties of human behavior.
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